AIPAC Memo

Congress Must Carefully Review U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Agreement

September 8, 2026

In late August, the Trump administration submitted to Congress an agreement with Saudi Arabia to facilitate peaceful nuclear energy cooperation between the countries—referred to as a 123 agreement. President Donald Trump said that under the agreement there will be “no enrichment” of uranium in Saudi Arabia, the agreement would have the highest standards for inspections, and its implementation would be subject to the Kingdom joining the Abraham Accords.

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However, the text of the agreement fails to meet these standards and leaves open a Saudi path to nuclear weapons. Congress must carefully review the agreement and seek explanations from the administration on why the agreement fails to meet the standards set by the president and past 123 agreements with other nations. Without satisfactory explanations, Congress should reject this agreement.

In July, President Trump said under the agreement, “There will be no enrichment of material!” However, the agreement contains no such explicit prohibition, and in fact directly envisions uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia.
Enriching uranium is a key step in the production of both fuel for nuclear energy reactors and fissile material for the core of a nuclear weapon. Given the dual role of uranium enrichment, the United States has long sought to limit the spread of enrichment technology. The U.S.-UAE 123 agreement, for example, contained an express prohibition on enrichment in the UAE and hence the agreement became known as the “Gold Standard.”
Under this agreement, a feasibility study will be conducted over the next two years to determine the long-term commercial viability of civil uranium enrichment in the kingdom. If the study finds enrichment in the Kingdom is warranted, U.S. companies could build an enrichment facility on Saudi territory.
The agreement directly envisions enrichment of uranium up to the 20% level—a short step from levels needed for use in nuclear weapons. Typically, uranium enriched to 3.67% is all that is needed for nuclear energy.
Saudi Arabia has no need to produce enriched uranium domestically, as nuclear fuel for energy reactors is widely available for purchase from trusted international suppliers—at costs far below what would be required to build and maintain a domestic enrichment capability. More than 20 countries, including Egypt, Turkey and the UAE, have nuclear energy programs but do not maintain domestic enrichment programs.
If Saudi Arabia is allowed to maintain an enrichment capacity, even if under U.S. ownership, there would be little impediment to Saudi Arabia taking over the facility, particularly if a new Saudi regime were to take power.
Any domestic enrichment capability poses a risk that nuclear material could be redirected by the new regime toward weaponization activity. Enrichment technology is inherently dual-use and, once established on Saudi soil, would give a future regime a latent breakout option that is fast, easy, and hard to reverse.
The lack of an enrichment ban also undermines U.S. efforts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran that prohibits enrichment. Other countries in the region may seek enrichment if Saudi Arabia is allowed the capability. The UAE forswore enrichment in its civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S., but the agreement allows the UAE to seek an amendment if other countries in the region enter into a more favorable agreement with the U.S.

Any agreement must contain a requirement for enhanced inspections in Saudi Arabia to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material.
However, the agreement presented to Congress does not require Saudi Arabia to sign the Additional Protocol (AP)—the highest standard for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear verification and safeguards. More than 140 other countries have already joined and adhere to the Additional Protocol.
A Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement submitted to Congress with the agreement directly states that Saudi Arabia’s adherence to the AP would “give the IAEA additional confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or nuclear activities in the Kingdom.”
Instead of adhering to the AP, the United States and Saudi Arabia concluded a separate safeguards agreement inviting the IAEA to monitor and inspect activity conducted pursuant to the broader agreement. However, the enhanced inspections would not apply to Saudi nuclear activity conducted outside of the agreement.
The proliferation assessment notes that Saudi Arabia has conducted nuclear activity with a host of adversarial countries, including Russia and China.

U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation is one of several potential incentives that have historically been offered to the Saudi leadership to help encourage Saudi-Israel normalization.
A Saudi decision to normalize relations with Israel and join the Abraham Accords would be a historic step forward for peace and regional stability, strengthening Israel’s security, deepening cooperation against Iran, and advancing U.S. interests in the Middle East. While President Trump has said Saudi Arabia must join the accords as part of the agreement, the text of the agreement does not include any commitment to do so.
A Saudi decision to join the Abraham Accords would not only transform Israel-Saudi relations; it could also catalyze additional Arab and Muslim-majority states to normalize ties with Israel, expanding the circle of peace and regional cooperation.
By joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia would unlock significant economic, technological, security, and diplomatic opportunities—including expanded investment and trade, deeper cooperation on energy and innovation, and closer strategic ties with the United States and other regional partners—benefits that existing Abraham Accords countries have already begun to realize.

The Way Forward

Congress must carefully review the agreement and seek explanations from the administration on why the agreement fails to meet the standards set by the president. Congress must make clear that any agreement needs to expressly prohibit domestic uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia, require the Kingdom to sign and adhere to the Additional Protocol, and be accompanied by progress toward normalized relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Click here for a downloadable PDF.

Congress Must Carefully Review U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Agreement

The Agreement Fails to Expressly Prohibit Uranium Enrichment in Saudi Arabia

The Agreement Lacks Key Verification Mechanisms

The Agreement Fails to Promote Normalized Relations Between Israel and Saudi Arabia

The Way Forward