AIPAC Memo

Reviewing Saudi Nuclear Cooperation

August 3, 2026

On July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to facilitate peaceful nuclear energy cooperation between the countries. President Donald Trump said that under the agreement there will be “no enrichment” of uranium in Saudi Arabia and its implementation would be subject to the Kingdom joining the Abraham Accords.

Given the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and the potential that a peaceful nuclear energy program can be used to further a weaponization program, Congress must carefully scrutinize the agreement to ensure it meets America’s nonproliferation priorities and reject any agreement that fails to foreclose any Saudi pathway to a nuclear weapon.

Enriching uranium is a key step in the production of both fuel for nuclear energy reactors and fissile material for the core of a nuclear weapon. Given the dual role of uranium enrichment, the United States has long sought to limit the spread of enrichment technology.
Saudi Arabia has no need to produce enriched uranium domestically as nuclear fuel for energy reactors is widely available for purchase from trusted international suppliers – at costs far below what would be required to build and maintain a domestic enrichment capability. More than 20 countries, including Egypt, Turkey and the UAE, have nuclear energy programs but do not maintain domestic enrichment programs.
If Saudi Arabia is allowed to maintain an enrichment capacity, even if under U.S. ownership in the Kingdom, Saudi technicians will gain valuable expertise that could be diverted to a weapons program.
If the current Saudi government was ever replaced by an anti-American regime, any domestic enrichment capability could be redirected by the new regime toward weaponization activity. Enrichment technology is inherently dual-use and, once established on Saudi soil, would give a future regime a latent breakout option that is fast, easy, and hard to reverse.
The lack of an enrichment ban would also undermine U.S. efforts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran that prohibits enrichment. Other countries in the region may also seek enrichment if Saudi Arabia is allowed the capability. The UAE forswore enrichment in its civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S., but the agreement allows the UAE to seek an amendment if other countries in the region enter into a more favorable agreement with the U.S.

Any agreement must contain a requirement for enhanced inspections in Saudi Arabia to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material.
Saudi Arabia has lagged the international community in adhering to advanced safeguards and allowing enhanced inspections. Unlike more than 140 other countries, Saudi Arabia has not signed the Additional Protocol—the highest standard for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear verification and safeguards.
Saudi Arabia’s standard comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA has only been in effect for less than two years.
The agreement also must include provisions to verify that spent nuclear fuel from nuclear energy reactors is safeguarded or removed from the country. Spent nuclear fuel can be reprocessed to extract plutonium which can be used in nuclear weapons.

U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation is one of several potential incentives that has historically been offered to the Saudi leadership to help encourage Saudi-Israel normalization.
A Saudi decision to normalize relations with Israel and join the Abraham Accords would be a historic step forward for peace and regional stability, strengthening Israel’s security, deepening cooperation against Iran, and advancing U.S. interests in the Middle East.
A Saudi decision to join the Abraham Accords would not only transform Israel-Saudi relations; it could also catalyze additional Arab and Muslim-majority states to normalize ties with Israel, expanding the circle of peace and regional cooperation.
By joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia would unlock significant economic, technological, security, and diplomatic opportunities—including expanded investment and trade, deeper cooperation on energy and innovation, and closer strategic ties with the United States and other regional partners—benefits that existing Abraham Accords countries have already begun to realize.

The Way Forward

U.S. law requires that any nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia be presented to Congress for review before going into effect.

Congress must carefully review the agreement to ensure it forecloses any potential Saudi pathway to nuclear weapons. Any agreement that fails to expressly prohibit domestic uranium enrichment in the Kingdom would raise serious concerns.

Congress must also continue to press Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel and enter the Abraham Accords.

Click here for a downloadable PDF.

Reviewing Saudi Nuclear Cooperation

Any Agreement Must Prohibit Uranium Enrichment on Saudi Soil

Any Agreement Must Have Strict Verification

Any Agreement Must Promote Israel-Saudi Relations

The Way Forward